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Introduction  
In the early 1990’s, many feminist philosophers found that the practice of the women´s movement as 
well as those of other new social movements, could be articulated most adequately in terms of 
citizenship. The classical political vocabulary of citizenship seemed to offer a viable alternative to the 
vocabularies that until then had been dominant in feminist political theory: the individualistic, rights-
oriented discourse of liberalism, and the structuralist, interest-oriented perspectives of socialism and 
marxism. Citizenship-talk made room for the political role of social groups and communities, and it 
emphasized the value of the attachment to and active participation within those communities. The 
focus on citizenship, moreover, enabled feminist theorists to rethink the political struggles and 
achievements of the women´s movement as part of a much larger process of democratization which 
had evolved in the modern western world since the American and French Revolutions. 
 Recent feminist reflections on citizenship are confonted by two nagging questions. The first 
concerns the relation between the political projects of multiculturalism and feminism: how to reconcile 
the justified demand of minority groups for recognition of their religious, ethnic or cultural identity 
with the feminist goal of the individual autonomy of women? Some feminists argue that 
multiculturalism is ‘bad for women’ because it tends to lock them up within the confines of their 
traditional, often patriarchal communities and actually hands them over to the power of the men within 
that community. Others perceive multiculturalism not as opposed to, but rather as allied to the feminist 
project: just as women have fought for the equal valuation of female differences, so are ethnic or 
cultural groups asking for the recognition of their differences. To reformulate this controversy in terms 
of citizenship: whereas some are deeply concerned that the granting of specific cultural rights to 
members of ethnic and cultural groups will privilege the male members of these groups and violate the 
civil, political and social rights of women, according to others the recognition of religious and cultural 
identity is nothing less but an example of the further democratization of western societies, of the 
inclusion of previous outsiders as legitimate members of civil society.   
 The second issue concerns the relationship between feminist struggles aimed at equality and 
justice for women, and struggles for more global justice between developed and developing countries. 
The nagging question here is: Who, as feminist citizens, do we reckon to be part of our community? 
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Should we aim at global justice for all women world-wide, or does our civic responsibility require us 
to primarily care for our co-citizens? This nagging question, as will become clear, is due to a tacit a 
assumption at the heart of contemporary political theories, namely that the territorial domain of the 
nation-state is the only political community which can endow individuals with the status, rights and 
privileges of citizenship.      
 
In this article I will distinguish three different feminist strategies regarding feminist citizenship: the 
strategy of inclusion, the strategy of reversal and the strategy of displacement.The meaning, usefulness 
and limitations of each will be assessed by exploring how it handles the much disputed issue of 
multiculturalism versus feminism. I will argue why the strategy of displacement seems to offer the 
best conceptual tools to steer a middle way between the radical affirmation and a wholesale rejection 
of multiculturalism. I will conclude with some reflections on how the current process of globalization 
not only affects the position of women worldwide in different and often contradictory ways, but how it 
also fundamentally challenges each of the three kinds of feminist citizen-talk discussed in this chapter. 
However, before diving into these specific debates, it seems wise to retreat for one moment and first 
get an idea of the relationship between feminism and political theory in general. 
 
Feminism and political theory  
Feminist practice and theory can be named political projects, in so far as they initiate processes of 
public negotiation and struggle over the right to equal participation in the exercise of government - 
over oneself as well as over one´s community. Feminist interventions are aimed at the equality of 
opportunities for each woman to develop her talents, to realize her ambitions and attain the same 
socio-economic status as men. Political activities which seek to establish more equality belong to the 
‘official-political sphere’ (Fraser 1997). They focus on problems that can be handled by existing 
governmental and social institutions. Demands put forward here focus on the acquisition of rights, to 
be layed down in official legislation. If successfull, these interventions result in the inclusion of 
women in the existing social and political order. However, for the transformation of such a de jure 
equality into de facto equality, a different kind of political activity is needed. These are activities 
which aim to redescribe matters hitherto defined as a-political matters of for instance economy, culture 
or family life, into political problems of exploitation, injustice or exclusion. Such practices of 
politicization involve the public contestation of dominant interpretations of codes of conduct, needs, 
interests and identities. They make public what was hitherto considered private. By exposing what is 
usually perceived of as necessary and naturally given as in fact contingent and socially constructed, 
they redefine what looked like inevitable fate into changeable circumstances. Such activities belong to 
the sphere of the ‘discursive-political’ (Fraser 1997).  
In the seventies, feminists confronted modern liberal thought with the slogan ‘the personal is 
the political’. Until then, it was taken for granted that the spheres of social relationships and personal 
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life should be regarded as ‘private’ domains, as spheres of freedom with which the state ought not 
interfere. On the one hand, government should interfere as little as possible with citizens’ activities in 
the public sphere. On the other hand, individuals’ most personal thoughts and projects should not be 
curbed either, not by state regulations, nor by civil conventions and social expectations. Hence, civil 
society counts as ‘private’ when opposed to the state, but as ‘public’ when opposed to the personal.  
But ‘the personal is the political’ also takes issue with this tripartite liberal-romantic 
framework for neglecting yet another public-private divide, namely the divide between the public and 
the domestic or family life. Many feminist critics have pointed out how liberal thought failed to 
theorize the very domain which serves to constitute and legitimize the framework of liberal political 
philosophy (Squires 1999: 27). On the one hand, the family is the realm of intimate relationships, 
based on values of love and care rather than economic gain, political power, or social status. On the 
other hand, the family is a public institution: marriage is a contract which regulates the rights and 
responsibilities of spouses, parents have legal custody over their children. Hence, the family emerges 
as a ‘private’ realm when opposed to civil society, but as a ‘public’ institution when contrasted to the 
the personal life of an individual.   
A final deconstructive move implied in ‘the personal is political’ involves the politicization of 
our intimate ‘inner’ life. Feminists put much effort in exposing the variegated ways in which our most 
personal needs and desires can be perceived of as the articulations of a dominant discourse. Rather 
than express the needs and desires of a universal human (or female) subject, they constitute what, in 
this particular time and place, counts as a human (or female) subject. Even our most intimate sexual 
desires can be interrogated for their implications on the level of social relationships, and even as 
autonomous subjects we are not simply the sources of our own speech and action, but the contingent 
outcome of social-symbolic processes of ‘subjectification’ and ‘abjection’ (Butler 1993).     
Hence, the feminist rallying cry ‘the personal is the political’ aptly summarizes the endless 
ways in which not only the official-political realm, i.e. the state, but also the spheres of civil society, 
the family and the personal are deeply political and pervaded by power.         
 
Citizenship 
From its very start, modern feminism constitutes a theory and practice which challenges the exclusion 
or marginalization of women in economic, social and political life. Feminists have fought for equal 
rights and opportunies, such as women’s right to education, economic independence or control over 
their own bodies. These demands for more equality within the existing societal order could, however, 
not ignore the different roles and identities historically ascribed to and adopted by women. 
Consequently, struggles for equality and inclusion were often accompanied by demands for particular 
rights, such as the right to maternity leave, or to specific welfare measures for single mothers. Hence, 
whereas on the one hand demands for the equality of women discarded sexual difference, they ever so 
often had to be based on the affirmation of sexual difference. This complicated predicament reminded 
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feminists that the dominant societal order was not a gender-neutral but a masculine order, which 
structurally favoured male subjects. Nowadays, it is acknowledged that equality and difference are not 
opposite but rather interdependent strategies, such that political equality rests upon the recognition of  
differences, which on its turn implies the recognition of the equal value of these differences (Bock & 
James 1992: 10).  
Finally, postmodernist thought has lead feminist intellectuals to critically interrogate oppositions such 
as equality versus difference themselves. They are interested in the myriad ways in which such 
oppositions produce their own ‘constitutive outside’ in the form of  ‘hybrid’ or ‘subaltern’ identities 
and practices. These identities and practices cannot be captured under either pole of a categorical 
divide, whereas they simultaneously form the matrix that produces these categorizations (Butler & 
Scott 1992).                
 
The development within feminist theories of citizenship follows a similar pattern as feminist theory in 
general. Thus, we can discern tendencies that focus at the equality and inclusion of women, arguing 
that women are to be recognized as full-fledged citizens. A second line of proposals, in drawing 
attention to the value of female and other differences, aims for the reversal of dominant, masculine or 
western conceptions of citizenship. Finally, there are political theorists who wish to deconstruct the 
dichotomous frameworks all together, a displacement which enables them to develop feminist 
reconceptualizations of liberal democracy (Squires 1999).    
 
The strategy of inclusion: women are citizens too 
 
The American and French Revolutions of the 18th century were the first political events in which the 
subjects of a souvereign power demanded to be acknowledged as equal citizens of their own state. The 
recognition of the equality of each citizen in the American Declararion of Independence (1776) self-
evidently applied to the white, male Anglo settler – but not to women, Blacks (slaves) or native 
Americans (indians). In a similar manner, in revolutionary France, the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen (1789) which elevated the status of ‘the commons’ to that of ‘citoyens’ excluded 
women. This was defended with the argument that, because women were economically dependent on 
and legally subordinated to (under coverture of) their fathers or husbands, they were unable to make 
independent judgements. Moreover, their social status thought to coincide with women’s natural 
predicament. Consequently, the democratic revolutions reserved citizenship status for property-
owning, male head of households only. Nevertheless, revolutionary slogans such that ‘men are born 
and remain free and equal in their rights’ or that ‘all Men are created equal’, were susceptible to the 
criticism that these ideals were not carried through to their full extent.   
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The American and the French Revolution clearly marked the beginning of the liberal-rights tradition. 
Within this tradition, citizenship consists primarily of the status, rights and entitlements granted by a 
state to its members. Usually, three kinds of citizenship rights are distinguished: civil rights, which 
secure the realization of individual freedom, such as freedom of speech and the right to own property; 
political rights, which allow for the (active and passive) participation in the exercise of government; 
and social rights, which guarantee each individual a minimum share in economic wealth and social 
security (Marshall 1950).  
Already in the 18th century, revolutionary women like Olympe de Gouge and Mary 
Wollstonecraft actually took the public stage to passionately argue for the inclusion of women as full-
fledged citizens within the political community. They thus presented themselves as active citizens, as 
individuals who had the competence to speak in public, to write political treatises, to set up a rational 
argument. In doing so, these women answered to the criteria of (good) citizenship set by another main 
tradition within citizenship-thought, the civic-republican tradition. Contrary to the liberal-rights 
tradition, which conceives of citizenship in terms of status, according to the republican view 
citizenship is determined by an individual´s active engagement with the public interest. Citizenship 
here does not so much involve the membership of a state, but membership of a community. And rather 
than start from the assumption of a self-interested self, it expects individuals to cultivate a virtuous self 
(Connolly 1991: 74). A good citizen, finally, is expected to cultivate typically manly virtues such as 
self-control, impartiality, and civic courage.     
 
To suggest, however, that the approaches of individual liberalism and civic-republicanism are 
diametrically opposed to one another, would be misleading. Within the liberal perspective, the 
allocation of rights is implicitly made dependent on the fulfillment of certain obligations, such as a 
citizen´s compliance to national laws and regulations. And no modern republican would deny that 
civic virtues are fostered most in a society which grants its citizens certain rights, such as the civil 
right of assembly, the political right to vote or the social right to education. The insight that rights-
based and virtue-based approaches to citizenship cannot be separated from eachother resonates in 
contemporary reflections on women’s inclusion as equal members of the citizenry. Thus, Ruth Lister 
argues for a ‘synthetic approach’ which conceives of citizenship as both status and practice, and 
acknowledges that civil, political and social rights are prerequisited for human agency, whereas, vice 
versa, agency is needed to acquire individual rights (Lister 2003). Susan Moller Okin pointed out that 
women only have an equal opportunity to positions of political influence after the transformation of 
the family from a patriarchal into a ‘gender-free’ institution. As long as they remain financially 
dependent on their husband, women cannot simply choose to step out of an oppressive relationship, let 
alone speak up in public. Only when they have a real exit-option, will women be able to use their 
voice and stand up for themselves (Okin 1989).       
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Okin’s use of the terms of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’, which she adopts from the political theorist Alfred 
Hirschmann, are particularly insightful with regard to her interventions in recent debates on 
multiculturalism. Okin took issue with the fact that participants in these debates often parry the 
question what to do if claims of special rights by minority cultures clash with the norm of gender 
equality that liberal states in principle endorse (Okin 1998; 1999). With this critique, Okin was the 
first in a long list of authors who questioned the feminist credentials of multiculturalism (Wikan 2002, 
Hirsi Ali 2002). Each of them chastised adherents to multiculturalism for their attempt to extend the 
list of liberal rights with a fourth type of rights, i.e. cultural rights. Multiculturalists defend the 
recognition of cultural rights as the logical extension of citizenship rights with the argument that for 
most individuals, their culture provides them with a meaningful context of choice and a sense of 
belonging which are essential for their well-being. Hence, it is a fundamental human right for 
individuals to maintain their own culture (Kymlicka 1995). Moreover, in an era of ongoing 
immigration, cultural rights also function as ‘rights of integration’, allowing non-citizens to become 
part of civil society on their own terms (Pía Lara 2002).  
 
To this line of reasoning, liberal feminists object that the crucial difference between civil, political and 
social rights on the one hand and cultural rights on the other is, that the first are individual rights 
whereas the latter are group rights. As group rights, cultural rights are at odds with the liberal value of 
individual freedom, and their recognition may have devastating consequences esepcially for the 
female members of a group. This is all the more true, according to Okin, when we realize that most 
cultures are deeply gendered, and that our individual sense of self is developed in the private sphere of 
domestic and family life. When we take this into consideration we find, first, that most cultures 
preserve their distinct character and values through regulations of sexuality, reproduction and family-
life, which affect the lives of women far more than the lives of men. Secondly, most cultures are 
patriarchal cultures, in which women’s lives are under the constant control of men, who expect them 
to serve their every desire and interest. Liberal thinkers who defend multiculturalism on the grounds 
that one’s own culture is an indispensable source for the development of self-esteem and self-respect, 
forget that in most cultures girls and women are often indoctrinated with the idea that they are of less 
value than boys, or that their life’s sole purpose is to guard the honour of the family. Okin argues that 
even a defense of group rights only insofar as these rights do not interfere with the freedom of  
individuals, concentrates too much on forms of overt restriction, to the detriment of the far more 
subtle, but no less influential discriminatory practices in the private sphere of the household and the 
family. Especially liberal multiculturalists should be critically aware of such intragroup inequalities. 
And even in the rare cases that a group has been rightfully granted the right to organize its community 
life according to its own traditional customs or religious prescriptions, Okin insists that individual 
members maintain the right to step out of their group whenever they wish to do so. Just as Okin in her 
earlier reflections endorsed the importance of women having a right to ‘exit’ from an oppressive 
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marriage, she now emphasize that liberal societies should do their utmost to lessen the inevitable 
(economic, social, emotional) costs when individuals (especially women) decide to distance 
themselves from their family, their church or their cultural-ethnic community – a position which, for 
that matter, most liberal multiculturalists wholeheartedly agree with.   
 
The strategy of reversal: communitarian and maternal thinking 
Liberal feminist critiques of multiculturalism, however, are sometimes countered by precisely the 
women they claim to stand up for. Thus, ever more muslim women speak up in public, through 
interventions in political debates, articles in news papers and academic books. And in western 
countries, ever more girls have taken to wearing the veil, some of them even causing quite a stir when 
challenging public authorities by attending class or appearing in court dressed in the traditional hijab. 
These muslim women thus manifest themselves as active citizens, initiating and participating in public 
debates by challenging the liberal-feminist idea that when women are free to choose their own way of 
life, they will self-evidently choose to live according to the values of secular liberalism. They object to 
the supposedly ethnocentric or ‘orientalist’ perspective of western feminists, accusing them of  
reducing muslim women to the position of ‘inessential Others’ (Al-Hibri 1999: 42). In contrast, they 
emphasize their commitment to their own cultural or religious community, of which they firmly 
believe that it can be changed. Such transformations, however, will not come from the outside, but are 
possible only from within. For these women, ‘muslim feminism’ is not a contradiction in terms, as 
secular feminists seem to assume. On the contrary, they argue that it offers the only viable strategy to 
really improve the position of muslim women. Many muslim feminists thus take great pains over re-
reading the Qur’an and the hadith in order to show that Islam in itself doesnot offer any legitimation 
for treating women differently from men. Thus, Leila Ahmed emphasizes ‘the egalitarian conception 
of gender inhering in the ethical vision of Islam’ (Ahmed 1992: 64), while Azizah Al-Hibri argues that 
some of the basic Islamic principles imply that women and men are equally entitled to engage in 
ijthihad (the interpretation of the religious texts), that Islam celebrates rather than suppresses diversity, 
and that Islamic law is meant to be flexible regarding time and place (Al-Hibri 1999: 43). Muslim 
feminists also make a point of distinguishing religion from culture, claiming that most woman-
unfriendly practices in comtemporary Muslim countries and communities can be traced back either to 
pre-Islamic custom or to their being imposed by conservative exegetes. And they claim that one 
should understand woman-unfriendly sura’s in their historical context, rather than hold on to their 
literal meaning in a world which has undergone dramatic changes (Selim 2003).  
Muslim feminists thus express a different view of feminist citizenship than their liberal and 
civic-republican counterparts. In many respects, their view can be perceived of as a particular version 
of communitarianism. Modern communitarians have attacked the rights-based approach of liberalism 
for its assumption of the individual as an ‘atomistic’ self, to replace it with a conception of the 
individual as an ‘embedded’ self. Within the liberal view, an individual can in principle stand back 
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from even her most dearly held convictions. From a communitarian perspective, however, ‘our selves 
are at least partly constituted by ends that we do not choose, but rather discover by virtue of our being 
embedded in some shared social context’ (Kymlicka 2002: 224). This doesnot imply that individuals 
can only obediently follow the traditions in which they are raised. Communitarians subscribe to 
crucial aspects of modernity, such as the validity of universal human rights. Modernity to them 
doesnot so much imply the rejection as the transformation of tradition.  
Muslim feminists choose to fulfill their civic duty by voicing their criticism, rather than 
stepping out of their community all-together. The liberal  preference for ‘exit’ indicates that liberals 
conceive of communities as voluntary associations, whereas the emphasis on ‘voice’ is in line with the 
communitarian view that many of our social ties are not freely chosen, but given. According to this 
view, most of us have strong emotional bonds with our parents, our family, our neighbourhood; we 
often find that the language, customs and habits with which we were raised make us feel more ‘at 
home’ at some places than at others. Our attachment to our communal values therefore is not the 
outcome of some reasonable judgement – it rather is something we discover to be an intimate part of 
ourselves, to constitute our identity. Communitarians agree with civic-republicans that the 
responsibility of individuals towards their community comes first. But in their eyes this does not so 
much require that citizens actively participate in political decision-making, but that they act decently 
by fulfilling their basic social obligations.  
Muslim feminism can be regarded as the most recent articulation of communitarian 
approaches to feminist citizenship. An earlier influential strand of communitarian thought within 
feminism has been elaborated by theorists such as Jean Bethke Elshtain and Sara Ruddick under the 
denominator of ‘maternal thinking’ (see chapter .. in this Handbook).  
While these early maternalist thinkers took women’s experiences as mothers, and (marxist-)feminist 
philosophies of standpoint as their points of departure, contemporary adherents are especially inspired 
by the activities of grass roots movements like the women’s peace camps at Greenham Common in 
Great Britain, the Madres of the Plaza del Mayo in Argentina, the Women in Black (an Israeli-
Palestinian peace organisation), or New York community workers engaged in fighting poverty (see 
Naples, chapter .. in this Handbook). Even organizations which initially started out of the purely 
personal concern of mothers for their children, or which seem to be engaged in ‘mere’ philantropic 
work, often inevitably get involved in political activities. As Pnina Werbner phrases it, these women 
thus testify to the view that one should ‘valorize maternal qualities […] as encompassing and anchored 
in democratic values’, and that ‘political motherhood’ is a viable and much needed alternative 
conception of active citizenship (Werbner 1999: 221).  
 
The strategy of displacement: feminist citizenship as a practice of  liberal democracy  
Admittedly, maternalist  thinkers have rightly criticized the false universalism of the traditions of civic 
republicanism and liberalism. These seemingly neutral conceptions of citizenship are indeed highly 
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gendered. But to simply replace them with a maternalist point of view doesnot really escape the 
dichotomous framework of gender. As a consequence, maternalist thinking may easily backfire on 
women. First, because it tends to essentialize female identity, it runs the risk of imposing the norms of 
maternalism on all women (Dietz 1985). Secondly, it may foster feelings of ressentment and claims to 
innocent victimhood and moral superiority vis-à-vis men. Thirdly, because it focuses at the 
‘remoralization’ rather than politicization of social life, a maternalist reversal risks playing into the 
hands of moral conservatism (Squires 1999: 169).  
Comparable risks threaten an all too uncritical espousal of a politics of multiculturalism and 
group rights by communitarian muslim feminists. First, muslim feminists spend much energy on re-
reading the Qur’an to support their interpretation of its verses as in fact very woman-friendly and 
emancipatory. However sympathetic, these attempts run parallel to the projects of islamic 
fundamentalists in their desire to go back to the original, the ‘true’ meaning of these sacred texts. As 
such, they run the risk of imposing a new kind of orthodoxy upon muslim women concerning the 
question how a ‘good’ muslima should live. Secondly, indulging in denunciations of orientalist 
‘othering’, and contrasting these dehumanizing gestures with a celebration of the supposedly true 
humaness and ethical integrity of Islam, may contribute to unproductive feelings of ressentiment 
and/or moral superiority - towards the western world in general, towards western feminism in 
particular. Thirdly, despite its emancipatory drive, like maternalist thinking, muslim feminism may 
well relapse into a position of moral conservatism.               
 
For these reasons, many political theorist have opted for a third strategy to give shape to feminist 
citizenship, the strategy of displacement. Politicization to these thinkers is the most vital aspect of 
feminist citizenship. The term comprises the entire gamut of strategies that feminists historically have 
followed to improve the position of women. As I have indicated earlier, savvy feminist critics may 
expose any area of public or private life and show how its discursive practices are subtly but deeply 
contestable. Recently, however, feminists have noted that to label a particular practice as contested, 
hence political, is in itself a political and therefore contested move. The exposure of  private-public 
boundaries as politically non-innocent constructions, does not mean that we should just dispense with 
them. On the contrary, to mark particular opinions, practices or domains as matters of private rather 
than public concern, constitutes an important safeguard for our individual liberty.  
With such self-reflexive notes, adherents to the strategy of displacement testify to their 
allegiance to a view of social and political reality as a discursive reality, mediated and sustained by 
linguistic and narrative conventions. They thus give a deconstructivist twist to the equal rights- and 
participatory perspectives of inclusion, as well as to the aim of the reversal of dominant (masculine or 
secular-western) values by feminist communitarians. Perhaps surprisingly, this in itself radical plea for 
a more politicized approach to feminist citizenship ends up with what looks like a politically quite 
moderate position, namely the revaluation of existing liberal-democratic societies. There seems to be a 
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growing consensus among feminist political theorists, that genderized or otherwise differential 
approaches to citizenship can be displaced only by feminist-informed practices of liberal democracy. 
This unexpected belief in the emancipatory and empowering potential of liberal-democracy is 
sustained by several insights.  
 
Firstly, feminist liberal democrats subscribe to a constructivist view of identity. Identities, whether 
sexual, cultural or religious, are the provisional outcome of dynamic processes of self-identification 
and ascriptions by others. Boundaries between groups are fluid and permeable, and axes of domination 
are constituted by the intersections and boundary-crossings between different (sexual, ethnic, cultural, 
religious) groups. Consequently, the use of dichotomous frameworks of gender, race or class, provides 
insufficient insight in the forms of injustice, misrecognition and exclusion that women from different 
backgrounds may suffer, nor will it offer viable strategies for political transformation. Instead, 
feminist citizenship involves the ongoing contestation of identities as given, of the way in which 
particular issues are framed, and of the tacit norms and values underlying supposedly gender- or value-
neutral policy measures. It recognizes that for instance in the context of the welfare state, of which 
women are the principal subjects, the idiom of ‘needs’ is not politically innocent, but may hide 
assumptions and controversies concerning who has the authority to decide what people ‘really’ need, 
which needs are a matter of legitimate political concern and which a matter of individual 
responsibility, and to which extent the dominant discourse on needs is in fact a gendered discourse. 
Such practices of contestation can assume all kinds of forms, from strategies of silent withdrawal or 
articulate resistance by individual clients to formally organized groups combatting disciplinary welfare 
practices (Fraser 1989).  
Secondly, it is agreed that one of the more effective ways to displace existing hegemonic 
relationships is through collective identity politics. Such collectivities, however, are preferably not 
based on primordial links such as motherhood, (muslim) sisterhood, or ethnicity. The political unity of 
a collective ‘we’ is never simply given, but the result of the creation and articulation of new political 
identities (Mouffe 1992). Donna Haraway evokes the figure of the former slave woman Sojourner 
Truth who with her ironical question ‘Ain´t I a Woman?’ simultaneously claimed and deconstructed 
the identity of ‘woman’(Haraway 1992: 96). Haraway’s earlier Manifesto for Cyborgs can equally be 
read as an alternative figuration of feminist citizenship, presenting the cyborg as a creature of a post-
gender world whose alliances are not based on identity, but on ‘affinity’ (Haraway 1991 [1985]). 
Twentieth century black feminists like Audre Lorde and Gloria Anzaldúa subscribe to such conscious 
mobilizations of identity. They suggest a conception of citizenship which allows women of all 
backgrounds to create commonality by both claiming and transfiguring given identities (Bickford 
1997).  
According to Seyla Benhabib, from the perspective of an outside observer, cultures appear as 
if they were unified organic wholes; from the perspective of an insider, however, they rather form ‘a 
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horizon that recedes ech time one approaches it’ (Benhabib 2002: 5). This implies that a politics of 
recognition need not involve the recognition of one particular identity. A politics of recognition might 
just as well ‘initiate critical dialogue and reflection in public life about the very identity of the 
collectivity itself’, allowing for democratic dissent and contestation, possibly leading to the ‘reflexive 
reconstitution of collective identities’ (70). This insight opens up space for women’s renegotiation of 
the dominant narratives of identity and difference within their own community. And it indicates that 
women of cultural and religious minority groups are not solely to be seen as ‘victims’, but also as the 
potential agents of change, as active citizens able to cross and renegotiate the boundaries between their 
own cultural or religious community and the wider society.                    
 
Thirdly, adherents to the strategy of displacement believe that whether a problematic belongs to the 
domain of the public or the private, justice or the good life, norms or values, is a matter of contestation 
– none of these discursive boundaries is sacred, each can be crossed and displaced. This fundamental 
openness vis-à-vis the subject of debate inevitably affects assumptions concerning the proper place for 
political speech and action, as well as ideas on the required style of public speech and action. In a truly 
open society there is a plurality of public spheres, ranging from the official sphere of representative 
institutions to the unofficial spheres of social movements, from voluntary civic associations to grass 
roots activism, from artistic to religious collectivities. Publics can be distinguished according to lines 
of ideology, class or identity, but also regarding their unequal status, their unequal access to discursive 
resources and positions of power. ‘Subaltern counterpublics’ may pop up at unexpected places, such as 
the mosque, the theatre or the school. And they may articulate their views through for instance 
religious lectures, movies or clothing. Such alternative styles challenge existing views of legitimate 
public speech and action by exploring its more affective, rhetorical and impassioned dimensions, by 
highlighting the particular rather than the universal, by appealing to desire rather than reason (Young 
1997; Mouffe 2002).  
 
Fourthly, value pluralism and conflicting interests are considered essential to a vital democracy. A 
viable theory of democratic citizenship should therefore theorize the ways in which conflicts can be 
kept alive and tackled at the same time. The relationship between political adversaries should be 
regulated such that their differences are neither soothed away, nor unnecessarily polarized..  
Still, there is significant controversy among adherents to the displacement strategy concerning 
the ultimate foundations of liberal democracy. Benhabib for instance develops the notion of  
‘interactive universalism’ in order to emphasize that the value of liberal democracy lies in its 
insistence that ‘participation precedes universality’ (Benhabib 1992). Inspired by Carol Gilligan’s 
ethic of care, she emphasizes the importance of openness in public deliberations to ‘the standpoint of 
the concrete other’, i.e. to the specific needs and interests of people who are different. But this attitude 
should never become a goal in itself, it should always serve as the critical position from which ‘the 
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standpoint of the general other’, i.e. the other as an equal bearer of rights and duties, is constantly 
questioned and revised. The ultimate aim of this responsiveness to particular others is to ensure that 
our institutions and laws live up to their claims of justice and fairness for all, i.e. to their claims of 
universality.  
Against this ‘deliberative’ view, Chantal Mouffe proposes a more ‘radical’ view of liberal 
democracy, which remains distrustful of any appeal to universal values. Democracy, according to 
Mouffe, is an ancient tradition in which equality and popular souvereignty are the core values. The 
liberal emphasis on freedom and individual rights, on the other hand, is a product of the modern era. 
Deliberative democrats deny the essential tension between the liberal espousal of individual rights, and 
the democratic emphasis on collective will formation. While democracy is built upon the opposition 
between ‘us’ (citizens) and ‘them’ (non-citizens), liberal principles apply to each individual, no matter 
her passport or place of residence. According to Mouffe, it is precisely this paradoxical nature of 
liberal democracy, which makes it such a valuable regime. Because any existing configuration of 
power can be challenged, liberal democratic regimes have propelled forth important historical political 
developments. It is therefore of the utmost importance to uphold the ‘agonistic’ nature of liberal 
democracy, and to distrust any legitimation of the status quo in terms of rational consensus. In the end, 
it is not public reason, but political passion that motivates citizens to actively participate in the public 
sphere. However fair the procedures, however reasonable their outcome, democratic struggles will 
always result in new forms of exclusion, i.e. in the hegemony of one particular (group) interest or form 
of life to the detriment of others (Mouffe 2000).  
 
Finally, it is recognized by deliberative and radical democrats alike that, despite the inevitability of 
value pluralism and conflicting interests, one of the most important public goods in a liberal 
democracy is ‘a viable sense of collective identity’ (Benhabib 1996). A liberal democracy is a political 
community, whose common good cannot be found at the level of substantive beliefs, but must be 
located at the level of agreed upon procedures for articulating conflicts and attaining (temporary) 
agreement. To this insight, and in line with her agonistic view, Chantal Mouffe adds the reminder that 
a fully inclusive political community can never be realized: each construction of a ‘we’ implies the 
constitution of an outside, of a ‘them’. She therefore prefers to view the common good of a political 
community as ‘a vanishing point’ - something to which we, as citizens, must constantly refer, but that 
can never be reached (Mouffe 1992: 379).  
 
Globalization 
Globalization can be seen as the set of economic and a cultural processes which 
simultaneously haunt and evade our contemporary thought on what may count as a political 
community (see chapter .. in this Handbook). Globalization puts doubt to previously self-
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evident assumptions concerning the power of the nation-state, the boundaries of civil society, 
and the scope of people to whom we are morally obligated: who do we consider to be part of 
‘our’community, who should we perceive as our co-citizens?  Should we as feminists aim at 
global justice for all women, or does our civic responsibility require us to primarily care for 
our co-citizens? Confronted with this choice between the liberal perspective of human rights, 
and the democratic perspective of the rights of souvereign peoples, most feminists do not 
hesitate. They prefer the ‘cosmopolitan’ view of citizenship which perceives human beings 
(men and women alike) as citizens of the global community, over and against the 
‘internationalist’ view according to which individuals primarily belong to, and demand rights 
and benefits from a particular political community or nation-state.  
However, international women´s networks and organizations which attempt to practice global feminist 
citizenship, are acutely aware that their struggles for the greater personal autonomy and equality for all 
women may not always mesh easily with their demands for a more just global economy (Sen & 
Onufer Correa 1999). Firstly, whereas the process of economic and cultural globalization has 
enhanced the empowerment of women worldwide, it has also facilitated the upsurge of religious 
fundamentalisms which instigated a conservative backlash. Thus, at the Fourth UN World Conference 
on Women in Beijing in 1995, the Vatican-branch of christian fundamentalism entered into alliances 
with its islamic counterparts in demanding that the personal autonomy of women be curbed by strict 
regulations concerning dress, sexuality, marriage and reproductive health. Such restrictions, moreover, 
are not merely imposed ‘from above’, they are also supported by many religious women themselves - 
‘from below’. This tension between the fight for women´s rights and the defense of patriarchal 
relationships is an apt illustration of the janus-face of globalization as a simultaneous process of 
modernization and traditionalization. While the outcomes of economic liberalization are embraced 
almost universally, cultural liberalization is resisted as a form of Western imperialism. Politically 
conscious women from the East and the South often choose to identify as citizens of their particular 
(religious or ethnic) community rather than as citizens of the universal community of humanity. Thus, 
global civil society seems to be marked by the same tension which troubles liberal multicultural states, 
i.e. the tension between the demands for individual rights for women on the one hand, and demands 
for collective rights by non-liberal groups and peoples on the other.  
 
Secondly, globalization confronts feminist theorists with the problem of the usefulness of the concept 
of citizenship itself. In the current era of ‘deterritorialization’, individual rights and responsibilities are 
less and less tied up with the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. Most western countries grant 
specific civil, social, and even some political rights to immigrants who are not (yet) naturalized 
citizens. On the other hand, social rights of citizens may be violated, for instance when they feel 
forced to accept jobs in so-called ‘free export zones’ within their own country. While national 
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governments provide transnational corporations with the infrastructure and energy needed to get their   
production work done, they at the same time allow them to profit from their ‘extraterritorial’ status by 
not paying taxes, evading import and export tarifs, and dodging national regulations concerning 
minimum payment or maximum working days. As an effect of globalization, contemporary nation-
states, especially western welfare states, are undergoing a significant face-lift: from ‘caring’ states they 
are gradually turning into ‘competitive’ states. Succumbing ever more to the pressures of privatization 
and liberalization issued by the global market, they loose their power to sustain networks of solidarity 
amongst compatriots and to safeguard people’s basic rights as citizens. 
This breakdown of the meaning of national citizenship as a guarantee for individual rights and 
benefits is accompanied by the rise of NGO’s like Amnesty International and DAWN (Development 
Alternatives with Women for a New era), the proliferation of international treaties and conferences 
(such as UN conferences on the position of women), and the emergence of a world-wide discourse on 
human and women’s rights. From this we might conclude that the decline of national political 
communities is somehow made good by the rise of a new political community, that of global civil 
society. That, however, would be an overhasty conclusion. For one thing, complaints against 
violations of human or women’s rights only make sense if they can be addressed to institutions with 
the political and juridical power to condemn and prohibit such practices. And the only institutions 
endowed with such effective power and jurisdiction still are the institutions of the nation-state. It 
seems that as yet only as citizens of a particular nation-state can we effectively appeal to our universal 
rights as human beings. And it might be an illusion to think international institutions, fora and treaties 
will, even in the longer run, be able to fill the gap created by the demise of nation-hood. Perhaps the 
ideal of a cosmopolitan ‘world republic’ is too far-fetched. It might very well be that the promotion of 
mutual trust and solidarity within particular national communities is the only viable way to achieve 
more global justice and democracy.  
It seems therefore that in the near future, feminist citizenship will have to be practised at two 
fronts at once. On the one hand, feminists need to strengthen further their international networks and 
alliances to fight for global justice and democratization for all women. On the other hand, we have to 
accept that nation-states do remain important transformative agents for achieving a gender-neutral 
‘community of fate’ (Van Gunsteren 1998). This acknowledment of the need for a dual strategy makes 
it even more urgent for feminist theorists to think through the notion of ‘global’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ 
citizenship more thoroughly. For, although it is widely agreed that a feminist practise of citizenship 
‘cannot stop at the borders of individual nation-states’ (Lister 2003: 199), it is far less clear what such 
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